A person might think with all that "wait and see evidence" out there that the defense would be in a hurry to have a hearing. Of course we all know there is no new evidence and that DNA did nothing but waste years of time.
The parties are advised this Court will not hold this cause in abeyance indefinitely. Yes, the US District court was pretty clear about this as well.Even where stay and abeyance is appropriate, the district court's discretion in structuring the stay is limited by the timeliness concerns reflected in AEDPA. A mixed petition should not be stayed indefinitely. Though, generally, a prisoner's "principal interest...is in obtaining speedy federal relief on his claims," Lundy, supra, at 520. 102 S.Ct. 1198 (plurality opinion), not all petitioners have an incentive to obtain federal relief as quickly as possible. In particular, capital petitioners might deliberately engage in dilatory tactics to prolong their incarceration and avoid execution of the sentence of death. Without time limits, petitioners could frustrate AEDPA's goal of finality by dragging out indefinitely their federal habeas review. Thus, district courts should place reasonable time limits on a petitioner's trip to state court and back. See, e.g., Zarvela, 254 F.3d. at 381 ("[District courts] should explicitly condition the stay on the prisoner's pursuing state court remedies within a brief interval, normally 30 days, after the stay is entered and returning to federal court within a similarly brief interval, normally 30 days, after state court exhaustion is completed"). And while they ruled there was no evidence of dilatory tactics at that time, if Burnett rules there were (and there were), Echol's Federal writ is pretty much doomed if the State files a motion to dismiss.Too bad Burnett, is off the case, Moron.
Quote from: Farm on June 03, 2008, 08:01:42 PMThe parties are advised this Court will not hold this cause in abeyance indefinitely. Yes, the US District court was pretty clear about this as well.Even where stay and abeyance is appropriate, the district court's discretion in structuring the stay is limited by the timeliness concerns reflected in AEDPA. A mixed petition should not be stayed indefinitely. Though, generally, a prisoner's "principal interest...is in obtaining speedy federal relief on his claims," Lundy, supra, at 520. 102 S.Ct. 1198 (plurality opinion), not all petitioners have an incentive to obtain federal relief as quickly as possible. In particular, capital petitioners might deliberately engage in dilatory tactics to prolong their incarceration and avoid execution of the sentence of death. Without time limits, petitioners could frustrate AEDPA's goal of finality by dragging out indefinitely their federal habeas review. Thus, district courts should place reasonable time limits on a petitioner's trip to state court and back. See, e.g., Zarvela, 254 F.3d. at 381 ("[District courts] should explicitly condition the stay on the prisoner's pursuing state court remedies within a brief interval, normally 30 days, after the stay is entered and returning to federal court within a similarly brief interval, normally 30 days, after state court exhaustion is completed"). And while they ruled there was no evidence of dilatory tactics at that time, if Burnett rules there were (and there were), Echol's Federal writ is pretty much doomed if the State files a motion to dismiss.Too bad Burnett, is off the case, Moron.